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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1696 
___________ 
 
COREY L. HARRIS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00209) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 4, 2014 
 
Before:  JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Corey Harris appeals the District Court’s entry of summary 
judgment affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his 
request for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) 
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under the Social Security Act (the “Act”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
In February 2006, Harris filed applications for DIB and SSI.  He alleged that he 
was disabled, and thus entitled to these benefits, due to left-foot problems and a mental 
and emotional breakdown.  Before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the parties 
presented a variety of documentary evidence, including reports of medical and mental-
health evaluations from Helen Kohn, M.D., John Kalata, M.D., Glenn Thompson, Ph.D., 
Glenn Bailey, Ph.D., Glenn Thompson, Ph.D., Liberty Eberly, D.O., Nhgia Tran, M.D., 
and Raymond Dalton, Ph.D; medical records from Hamot Medical Center, St. Vincent 
Health Center, and Prison Health Services; progress notes from Stairways Outpatient and 
Safe Harbor Behavioral Health; and information about Harris’s educational and 
vocational history.   
In August 2010, after holding a hearing, the ALJ denied Harris’s request for 
benefits.  The ALJ determined that Harris suffered from three impairments that qualified 
as serious under the Act:  mood disorder, personality disorder, and pain in his left foot.  
Nevertheless, the ALJ ruled that none of these impairments was equivalent to one of the 
impairments listed in the relevant regulations that precludes gainful employment.  The 
ALJ next concluded that Harris possessed the residual functional capacity to perform 
certain light work.  Finally, the ALJ ruled that, “[c]onsidering [Harris’s] age, education, 
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 
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numbers in the national economy that [Harris] can perform.”  More specifically, the ALJ 
concluded that Harris could work as an abrasive machine operator, a machine feeder, and 
a bench assembler.  Consequently, the ALJ determined that Harris was not disabled and 
thus not entitled to DIB or SSI. 
Harris appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review.  
Harris subsequently provided additional documentary evidence to the Appeals Council 
and asked the Appeals Council to reopen his case.  The Appeals Council denied this 
request, and Harris instituted an action in the District Court challenging the denial of 
benefits.  The District Court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence, and thus granted judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  Harris 
then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
Like the District Court, we uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence.  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  It is “more than a 
mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. 
Although the action in the District Court concerned solely the Commissioner’s 
denial of Harris’s requests for DIB and SSI, in his appellate brief, Harris presents 
sprawling allegations concerning employment discrimination, theft, conspiracy, and false 
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imprisonment.  We will not address the merits of these claims for the first time on appeal.   
See C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 73 (3d Cir. 2010). 
With respect to the arguments that are properly before us,1 Harris first contends 
that the ALJ erred in failing to credit a statement from Dr. Eberly that Harris “may never 
be able to return to work in a full-time capacity.”  Dr. Eberly made this statement, 
without elaboration, in a form she provided to the Erie County Court of Common Pleas 
for use in one of Harris’s child-support actions.  However, Harris failed to present this 
form to the ALJ; rather, he provided it for the first time to the Appeals Council in support 
of his request for reopening.  To obtain relief in federal court based on evidence that was 
not submitted to the ALJ, a claimant must “show[] good cause why that evidence was not 
procured or presented before the ALJ’s decision.”  Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 
F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011).  Harris has made no effort to satisfy this standard, and no 
justification for his failure to provide this statement earlier is apparent in the record.  
                                              
1 Because Harris is proceeding pro se, we construe his brief liberally, and will address 
even those arguments that he has not developed in great detail.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007).  At the same time, we will review only those 
arguments that he has actually presented.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in 
his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); see also Timson v. 
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed 
by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed 
abandoned[.]” (internal citation omitted)). 
 5 
 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in refusing to remand the case based on Dr. 
Eberly’s statement.2  See id. 
Next, Harris argues that the jobs that the ALJ concluded he was capable of 
working were not currently available to him in Erie, Pennsylvania.  This argument is 
foreclosed by the Act itself, which provides that an individual will qualify as disabled 
only if his impairment is of such severity that he cannot “engage in any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such 
work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy 
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 742 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009). 
Harris also contends that the ALJ erred in finding that when he took his 
psychiatric medication, his mental and emotional condition improved.  According to 
Harris, any improvement was abated by the medicine’s side effects, such as dizziness.  
However, Harris neither testified in his hearing that the medication caused side effects 
nor presented any documentary evidence in support of this contention; indeed, there is no 
mention of side effects anywhere in the administrative record.  Moreover, there is 
extensive evidence in the record that the medication did, in fact, help manage Harris’s 
                                              
2 Moreover, given the conclusory nature of the statement and its inconsistency with other 
evidence in the record, it would have been proper for the ALJ to accord it little weight.  
See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).   
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condition.  Accordingly, Harris’s challenge to the ALJ’s findings on this issue lacks 
merit.  See generally Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. 
Finally, although Harris has not specifically challenged the ALJ’s overall 
conclusion that he is not disabled, we have independently reviewed the record and 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ruling, for essentially the reasons 
detailed by the District Court.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 
